ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES IN SUCCESSIVE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS by unknown
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES IN SUCCESSIVE
INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
WHEN a bankruptcy court obtains jurisdiction over a debtor's property,
for purposes of either liquidating or reorganizing the estate, it must fre-
quently determine what recognition should be given to allowances made in
prior proceedings of a similar nature in state or federal courts. These allow-
ances, which represent the costs of administering the prior proceeding, may
comprise the fees of receivers, trustees and attorneys, the expenses incurred
in preserving the debtor's estate, and, in some cases, the costs of conducting
the business of the debtor while under the jurisdiction of the court. The
power of the bankruptcy court to review such allowances and the priority
of payment to which they are entitled depend upon the nature of the service
for which the allowance was granted and upon the character of the pro-
ceedings involved. This Comment will consider the various types of allow-
ances under three headings: first, when proceedings for adjudication as a
bankrupt supersede a receivership; second, when reorganization proceedings
under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act supersede either a receivership or
a bankruptcy; and third, when an unsuccessful reorganization is followed by
liquidation or by return of the property to a prior receiver or trustee, or
to the debtor.
Where a petition in bankruptcy is filed affecting a corporation which is
already in receivership, the trustee is faced with the problem of acquiring
the property from the jurisdiction of the receivership court. If the receiver-
ship preceded the filing of the petition by more than four months, well
settled principles of comity generally preclude the trustee from seizing the
property, and consequently the bankruptcy proceeding must fail.' If bank-
ruptcy intervenes within four months of the inauguration of the receivership,
however, the bankruptcy court obtains jurisdiction over the estate as of the
date of filing the petition.2
Because of the paramount jurisdiction enjoyed by bankruptcy courts, any
allowances for fees made by the receivership court after the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy is subject to review in the bankruptcy proceeding. 8
1. Blair v. Brailey, 221 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915); Hodver v. Mortgage Co.
for America, 290 Fed. 891 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923). But cf. In re Weedman Stove Co.,
199 Fed. 948 (E. D. Ark. 1912).
2. In re Williams, 240 Fed. 788 (N. D. Ohio 1917); In re Diamond's Estate,
259 Fed. 70 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919) ; cf. In re Watts and Sachs, 190 U. S. 1 (1903) (bank-
ruptcy following assignment for benefit of creditors).
3. Gross v. Irving Trust Co., 289 U. S. 342 (1933); Taylor v. Sternberg, 293
U. S. 470 (1935); In re Rogers, 116 Fed. 435 (S. D. Ga. 1902) (state court cannot
turn res over to bankruptcy court on condition that it pay the sum ordered by the
state court) ; Hume v. Myers, 242 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917) ; Moore v. Garraguez,
83 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936). Some state courts, however, formerly insisted
upon their right to pay the allowances before turning the rcs over to the bankruptcy
court. See (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1234, 1235.
262
ADMINISTRAT"IlE EXPENSES
.Moreover, if actual payments to receivers or attorneys after that time are
excessive, the trustee may recover the excess in a summary proceeding.4
The right to review allowances made before the filing of the petition
generally will depend upon the finality of the order of the receiver-
ship court. Immediate payment of the allowance, or even an order directing
such payment out of cash in hand, cannot be attacked collaterally by the
trustee in bankruptcy.5 But in the usual receivership, the court will not take
final action upon fees until the accounting at the termination of the proceed-
ing; when bankruptcy intervenes before that time, the right to fix compensa-
tion and to determine its priority of payment passes to the bankruptcy court.0
In exercising their discretionary power over fees, however, bankruptcy courts
have attached considerable weight to the receivership court's evaluation of a
reasonable award It has even been suggested that where no allowance has
been set in the prior proceeding, application should be made to the receiver-
ship court to fix fees which will reasonably compensate receivers and at-
torneys for their services.8 Since the receivership court is clearly in a more
advantageous position to adjudge the value of these services, some such
practice would seem advisable, provided that bankruptcy courts do not hesi-
tate to exercise their prerogative to scale down exorbitant and unreasonable
fees. Although the Bankruptcy Act grants no priority to the costs of admin-
istering prior proceedings, 9 allowances for fees which have been passed upon
by a bankruptcy court will generally be paid in full. They will thus take
precedence over unsecured claims.' Moreover, when the services involved
were clearly necessary to the preservation of the estate" or where secured
creditors actually or impliedly have consented,' 2 such allowances may be
paid even in advance of secured claims, provided the assets of the bankrupt
would otherwise be insufficient to satisfy them.
As in the case of fees, the expenses and obligations of a receiver in pre-
serving the property and in running the business of a debtor are subject
to review in a subsequent bankruptcy, if the expenditures occurred after
the filing of the petition or if no final accounting or judicial approval of
4. See In re Moore, 42 F. (2d) 475 (N. D. Ga. 1930).
5. See Taylor v. Sternberg, 293 U. S. 470, 472 (1935); In re Williams, 240 Fed.
788, 789 (N. D. Ohio 1917); In re Diamond's Estate, 259 Fed. 70, 74 (C. C. A. 6th,
1919); Moore v. Scott, 55 F. (2d) 863, 865 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
6. In re Insull Utility Investments, Inc., 74 F. (2d) 510 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
7. See id., at 515.
8. (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1234, 1236.
9. § 64(b), 44 SrAT. 666 (1926), 11 U.S.C. § 104(b) (1934), which sets the pri-
orities in the bankruptcy proceedings, grants priority to ". . . (1) the actual and
necessary cost of preserving the estate subsequent to the filing of the petition . . . "
10. See In re Paramount Publix Corp., 10 F. Supp. 504, 507 (S. D. X. Y. 1934).
11. Paine v. Archer, 233 Fed. 259 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916).
12. In re Quemahoning Creek Coal Co., 15 F. (2d) 58 (W. D. Pa. 1926).
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disbursements had taken place prior to that time.13 Very often, however,
a receivership court will authorize a receiver in advance to incur those lia-
bilities which are necessary to carry out the purpose of the proceeding, and
to issue receivership certificates therefor. 14 These are usually given a stated
priority over the various creditors.Yr When the purpose of the expenditures
is to preserve the estate, the certificates will usually take priority over secured
claims.1 6 Liabilities which are incurred merely to carry on the business of
the debtor generally take priority over the claims of unsecured creditors 7
and over claims of secured creditors who have consented to or authorized
them.18 A notable exception to this rule has been made in the case of public
service corporations.1 9 In view of the dearth of authority on the subject,
it is difficult to determine whether or not a bankruptcy court may disallow
claims based on certificates authorized in a prior receivership, but where
these certificates represent a lien upon the property of the debtor created
within four months of an impending bankruptcy, it is possible that the
bankruptcy court could set aside the lien under Section 67(c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, which provides for the displacement of liens under certain
conditions. 2
0
In those cases in which the right to review the obligations of an earlier
receivership exists, the bankruptcy courts have generally applied the same
rules of priority as obtain in equity proceedings and have satisfied such obli-
gations ahead of secured claims when they were necessary to the preserva-
13. In re Benwood Brewing Co., 202 Fed. 326 (N. D. W. Va. 1913); Smith v.
Shenandoah Valley Nat. Bank of Winchester, 246 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917).
14. 1 GEmEs, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) § 396.
15. Ibid.
16. 16 FLETCHER, CYc. CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1931) § 7947.
17. Ibid.
18. Kent v. Lake Superior Ship Canal, Ry., and Iron Co., 144 U. S. 75 (1892);
see Baltimore Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Alderson, 90 Fed. 142, 147 (C. C.A. 4th, 1898).
If the debts have been improvidently incurred, or have not been authorized by the
receivership court and were not necessary to the preservation of the estate, they are
relegated to the position of ordinary unsecured claims. Piedmont Corp. v. Gainesville
and N. W. R. R., 30 F. (2d) 525 (N. D. Ga. 1929); Darling v. Cornstalk Products
Co., 54 F. (2d) 670 (E. D. Ill. 1931); 16 FLETCHER, CYc. CORPORATIONS (perm. cd.
1931) § 7947.
19. For a discussion of claims in public service company receiverships, see Fitz-
Gibbon, The Present Status of the Six Months Rule (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 230. In
some cases priority has been granted to six months claims in receiverships of private
corporations. See 2 GERDEs, op. cit. supra note 14, § 675.
20. 30 STAT. 564 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 107(c) (1934). A lien created within four
months before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy is dissolved by the adjudication
". .. if (1) it appears that siid lien was obtained and permitted while the defendant
was insolvent and that its existence and enforcement will work a preference, or (2)
the party or parties to be benefited thereby had reasonable cause to believe the defendant
was insolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy, or (3) that such lien was sought
and permitted in fraud of the provisions of this Act . . . "
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tion of the estate2- or where the consent of secured creditors had been
obtained.22 In other cases of authorized expenditures the claims of third
parties against the receivers for receivership expenses have been preferred
over unsecured claims against the estateP- But when the obligations were
improvidently incurred 24 or were not authorized by the receivership court,"
generally they have been denied any priority unless they happen to fall
within the priority section26 of the Bankruptcy Act which grants priority
to taxes, wages earned within three months of the filing of the petition, and
claims entitled to priority under state law. Since obligations of prior receiver-
ships will seldom be satisfied in full unless they are given a priority, at
least over unsecured claims, strong arguments may be advanced for granting
the requisite priority whenever these obligations have been duly authorized
by a receivership court. If receivership certificates are not accorded priority-
in bankruptcy, receivers will encounter considerable difficulty in securing
credit until after the four months period has passed.2
A reorganization proceeding under Section 7713 is designed for the re-
habilitation and ultimate reestablislmlent of the debtor corporation as a going
concern. 29 To facilitate the reorganization process by eliminating jurisdic-
tional conflicts, the Act provided that the institution of proceedings under
it should automatically suspend prior receiverships and bankruptcies, which
may thus be superseded irrespective of the time when they were commenced3O
Fair treatment of the costs of administering these prior proceedings is in-
sured by the specific direction to the reorganization judge in Subsection (i)
to ". . . make such orders as he may deem equitable for the protection of
obligations incurred by the receiver or prior trustee and for the payment
of such reasonable administrative expenses and allowances in the prior pro-
ceeding as may be fixed by the court appointing said receiver or prior trustee
21. Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734 (1876); Paine v. Archer, 233 Fed. 259
(C. C.A. 9th, 1916).
22. In re Erie Lumber Co., 150 Fed. 817 (S. D. Ga. 1906) ; In re Benwend Brewing
Co., 202 Fed. 326 (N. D. W. Va. 1913); Smith v. Shenandoah Valley Nat. Bank of
Winchester, 246 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917).
23. In re J. H. Alison Lumber Co., 137 Fed. 643 (S. D. Ga. 1905) ; In re Benwood
Brewing Co., 202 Fed. 326 (N. D. W. Va. 1913); 5 R p mou , Bmunmurrcy (4th
ed, 1936) § 2098.
24. In re Alison Lumber Co., 137 Fed. 643 (S. D. Ga. 1905).
25. In re Benwood Brewing Co., 202 Fed. 326 (N. D. W. Va. 1913); Smith v.
Shenandoah Nat Bank of Winchester, 246 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917).
26. §64.
27. See I GraDEs, loc. cit. supra note 14.
28. See (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1234, 1236.
29. See In re Island Park Associates, Inc., 77 F. (2d) 334, 337 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935);
Brockett v. Winkle Terra Cotta Co., 81 F. (2d) 949, 953 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
30. BANrRUPTCY AcT §77B(i), 48 STAT. 920, 11 U. S. C. §207(i)(1934); In re
Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734 (C.C.A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, sub. no=.
Troutman v. Compton, 294 U. S. 725 (1935).
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Since this section does not purport to define the scope of a reorganization
court's control over the administration of prior proceedings, the right to
review allowances is probably no broader in reorganization than in bank-
ruptcy.3 1 Where the right to review is present, however, as where the
superseded court failed to pass on the allowances or did not order them
paid before reorganization intervened, the various costs of administration are
treated differently in reorganization. A distinction seems to have been made
for the first time 32 between "reasonable administrative expenses and allow-
ances," which must be "paid" in the reorganization proceedings, and "obli-
gations," which need only be "protected." Although no hard line has yet
been drawn by the courts between these two classifications, it seems that
the term "obligation" comprises the various liabilities which the prior receiver
or trustee might incur in managing the property of the debtor33 such as
salaries, supplies, wages, rent and taxes, while "administrative expenses and
allowances" represent the more technical aspects of the court proceeding
such as filing fees, fees and expenses of receivers or trustees, and their
attorneys and employees.
In dealing with those "administrative expenses and allowances" which are
reviewable34 in reorganization, the court is empowered to scale down prior
allowances which are not considered reasonable, 35 although the bankruptcy
practice of treating determinations made by the superseded court as presump-
31. Shulman v. Wilson-Sheridan Hotel Co., 301 U. S. 172 (1937); In re 7000
South Shore Drive Bldg. Corp., 86 F. (2d) 499 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
32. Prior to the passage of this section both were included under the heading
"Costs of Administration." See 3 GERDES, op. cit. supra note 14, §§ 1159-1161.
33. In re Parker Young Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. f, 3399 (D. N. H. 1935);
7 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTc Y (4th ed. 1934) § 3154.968.
34. If the allowances have been paid or ordered paid before the vesting of the
jurisdiction of the reorganization court, they must be allowed to stand. In re 7000
South Shore Drive Bldg. Corp., 86 F. (2d) 499 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); In re Central
Shorewood Bldg. Corp., 90 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937); see Shulman v. Wilson-
Sheridan Hotel Co., 301 U. S. 172, 173 (1937). For a discussion of whether an
allowance for services rendered and to be rendered is a final order, see (1937) 4 U. or
CH. L. REv. 673; In re Central Shorewood Bldg. Corp., 90 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A.
7th, 1937).
35. Shulman v. Wilson-Sheridan Hotel Co., 301 U. S. 172 (1937). Allowances
were also scaled down in In rc Allied Owners, Inc., 79 F. (2d) 187 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935)
aff'd, sub nomine Callaghan v. R. F. C., 297 U.S. 464 (1936); In re New York In-
vestors, Inc., 79 F. (2d) 182 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); In re Kelly Springfield Tire Co.,
13 F. Supp. 724 (D. 'M d. 1935), appeal denied, 82 F. (2d) 1020 (C. C.A. 4th, 1936) ;
In re Davison Chemical Co., 14 F. Supp. 821 (D. Md. 1936). In In re Memphis Street
Ry., 11 F. Supp. 682 (W. D. Tenn., 1935), the fees were allowed as ordered on a
per month basis in the prior proceeding without any discussion.
It has been stated that allowances may not be increased. See In rc New York
Investors, Inc., 79 F. (2d) 179, 181 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, sulb. nora. Etdel-
man v. R. F. C., 296 U. S. 649 (1935). But see In re Central Shorewood Bldg. Corp.,
90 F. (2d) 725 (C. C.A. 7th, 1937).
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tively correct is often followed. 30 Some courts have also pursued the im-
plication of the statute and have refused to make allowances for services
in prior proceedings until the fees had been fixed by the court appointing
the prior trustee or receiver.37 Additional complications are introduced in
cases where reorganization supersedes a prior bankruptcy, for it has been
held that the discretionary powers conferred on the reorganization judge
under Subsection (i) do not affect the operation of Sections 48 3S and 40 33
of the Bankruptcy Act which fix a maximum limit on the fees of trustees,
receivers and referees in bankruptcy.4 0 Since the statute expressly provides
for the payment of reasonable administrative expenses of prior proceedings,
there seems to be no problem as to whether or not allowances for fees
should be preferred over other claims against the estate. Even if the fees
are reduced in the reorganization proceeding, the court will probably provide
for the immediate payment of the determined amount and will certainly
insist that provision for payment be included in the reorgani7ation plan. 41
While "administrative expenses and allowances" may be scaled down by
the 77B court, born fide third party obligations of the prior proceeding must
probably be paid in full.42 The statutory mandate that such obligations shall
be "protected" has been interpreted t: mean that the reorganization court
must exercise its independent judgment as tu their validity and terms,43
and. in some cases. postpone payment for a limited period of time.44 The
decisions mar be rationalized according to the nature of the various claims
involved and according to the effect which immediate payment would have
upon fie ultimate reorganization.4 5 Thus supply and wage claims, as well
as other running expenses of the prior proceeding, will probably be paid as
soon as they fall due, provided that the 77B court is satisfied as to their
validity. 46 Current operating charges of this type must be incurred if the
36. See In re Daxison Chemical Co.. 14 F. Supp. 21. 840 (1). Md. 1936); Gross-
man v. Kridel. 90 F. (2d) 624 (C. C. A. 2d. 1937).
37. In re 211 Eat Ihlaware Place Bldg. L',,rp.. 7 F. Sursp. 692 (E. D. 111. 1934).
38. 36 STA-.T. 840 (1910), 11 U. S. C. §76 (1934). This sets the compenation of
bankruptcy receivers and trustees.
39. 32 STAT. 799 (1903), 11 U. S. C. §6eSa(1934j. This secti,n ets reierces'
compensation.
40. Callaghian v. R. F. C.. 297 V. S. 464 (1036).
41. See cases cited note 35, sirpra.
42. See In re United Cinar Sto.re, o~f Amnrica, 78 F. (2d) 691, 693 (C C.A. 2d,
193"-).
43. In re Parker-Young Co.. C. C. 11. lanhr. Ser%. I 33' (D, . M1 19351.
44. In re United Cigar Stores of Amnric-a. 78 F. (2,1) #,91 (C. C.A. 2d. 1935).
Tle v, -rd "protect" is a convenientl. %agtt tkrin uhticl d i ' it,, exprcly dcn) r-r-
ganiza:',i courts th,: p.,\er to scale d lwa pr:, r 0,l4ic-i -n. Inl ntn c-irt Pa's %et
su..,.e, ,-t"' this psihiIt}.
45. Id.. at (.93.
46. In r- l'arl er-Y' uui Co.. C. C. 11 lanlr S rv. 3lM (1) V I1. 1935)
(Lr. r val of wa., " r'r-wt 1Id a naltr f r tl'v ro r a' ', , t° c ,,at I Ir re
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debtor is to continue as a going concern. Since they can usually be paid
out of current earnings, the immediate discharge of these obligations will
not materially affect the consummation of a reorganization plan. Indeed,
failure to satisfy these charges might easily have the effect of impairing the
entire reorganization process, by making it increasingly difficult for receivers
and trustees to secure the new money and materials essential to the continued
operation of the debtor corporation. Although the priority section of the
Bankruptcy Act does not apply to Section 77B,47 taxes,4 8 likewise, will ordi-
narily-be paid as soon as they are adjudicated valid charges against the
estate.49 Practical considerations usually warrant their immediate payment,
especially when delay might entail penalty assessments 0 or forfeiture of the
corporate franchise.51
Sometimes, however, obligations will be incurred in prior proceedings
which in no way contribute to the final rehabilitation of a debtor corporation.
Liquidation dividends declared in prior bankruptcies are illustrative of this
class. If these dividends are large and are considered as obligations binding
upon the 77B court, immediate payment might jeopardize the entire reor-
ganization. Even if the dividends declared to creditors are small, or have
been largely paid off, so that they constitute only a minor share of the
total liabilities of the estate, there is little reason for discharging them im-
mediately in the reorganization proceeding. The better practice, and the
one actually adopted by the courts,52 is to delay any distribution until the
final consummation of a plan. They must then probably be paid in full
if they were validly declared in the prior proceeding.
3
Theatres Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 14679 (S. D. N. Y. 1937) (supply debts in-
curred in good faith to be paid in full).
47. § 77B (k). The priority section does, however, apply when the estate is to be
liquidated. See page 270, infra.
48. Taxes have been held not entitled to priority. In re Central Public Service
Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 13723 (D. Md. 1935); cf. In re Pressed Steel Car Co.
of N. J., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 114745 (W. D. Pa. 1937).
49. In rc Central Public Service Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. %13723 (D. Md.
1935); Hennepin County, Minn. v. M. W. Savage Factories, Inc., 83 F. (2d) 453
(C. C.A. 8th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 555 (1936); Parsons v. Detroit and
Canadian Tunnel Co., 15 F. Supp. 986 (E. D. Mich. 1936). Most taxes failing due
during an insolvency proceeding are considered as administrative expenses. HIun,
RFcvrvERs (4th ed. 1905) § 881a. However, franchise taxes often are held not to be
such expenses. In re Pressed Steel Car Co. of New Jersey, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 1 4745
(W. D. Pa. 1937).
50. County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U. S. 80 (1929); see Rogge, The
Difference in the Priority of the United States in Bankruptcy and in Equity Reeeiver-
ships (1929) 43 Hnv. L. Rzv. 251, at 260. Interest must also be paid. Board of
Commissioners of Sweetwater County, Wyo. v. Bernardin, 74 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A.
10th, 1934), cert. denied, 295 U. S. 731 (1935).
51. Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U. S. 334 (1932).
52. In re United Cigar Stores Co. of America, 78 F. (2d) 691 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
53. Ibid.
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In determining whether specific obligations should be paid immediately or
postponed, reorganization courts must be governed largely by the expediencies
of the particular case involved, for there is little authority upon which they
can base their decision. The protection of obligations under Subsection (i)
clearly has no relation to tie detennination of relative priorities in bank-
ruptcy. The objectives of bankruptcy proceedings are liquidation of the
debtor's estate and distribution of as.sets among the various classes of credi-
tors according to their status under Section 64, the priority section of the
act. Since the total assets of the bankrupt are rarely sufficient to satisfy
all claims against the estate, this section determines what creditors must
be paid first. But so far as appears in the cases decided to date, all obliga-
tions within the meaning of Subsection (i) must eventually be paid in
full, and whether the payment shall be immediate is within the discretion
of the court. It is likely that ,his discretion will be exercised in the light
of the priority schedules commonly employed in federal equity receiverships,
since the purpose of these proceedings- rehabilitation of the debtor cor-
poration-is identical with that of 77B reorganizations, and similar prob-
lems are therefore often encountered in determining the order in which
various claims must be paid. In general the order of payment in equity
proceedings is: (1) the expenses of the receivership including court costs,
fees, costs of preserving the estate, and costs of running the business, payable
in the order given ;54 (2) six months claims;5 (3) liens given priority by
statutc ;o (4) secured claims :"; (5) debts due the United States, a statutory
priority obtaining only when the debtor is insolvent;S (6) claims given
priority under local law ; (7) other debts owed by the corporation. To the
extent that the "obligations" of prior proceedings resemble the various com-
ponents of this list, reorganization courts may find equity precedents helpful
in Jixing an order of temporal priority under subsection (i). This schedule,
howexer, should not be regarded as determinative by 77B courts, for the
very fact that no order of priority is given in the statute indicates an intent
54. Piedmont v. Gainesville and N. W. R. I.. 30 F. (2d) 525 tX. D. Ga. 1929).
For a detailed discussion of the priority order in coluity, set: 2 Gi.totss, Co.o=RAT Rzoz-
GAxIZATIONS (1936) §§639-680. For a discussion uf the priorities given claims in
reorganization proceedings, see Ctomment (1937) 85 U. or I,.%. I. Rx. 813.
55. See note 19, supra.
56. E.g., for taxes, REy. STAT. §31S6 11875). 2 U. S. C. § IFui 11934); fur rent,
Civ. CODE LA. (Dart. 1932) Art. 2705: fo-r lahr. Qiiio G:. Com (Page. 1926)
§ 8309 ei seq.
57. See 2 GERDES. Op. cit. supra note 14, §§ 615. t,40.
58. REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U. S. C. §191 (1934). This statute dees not
give the United States a lien. Nor does it displace liens. Sa%ings and Loan SFriety
v. Multnomah County. 169 U. S. 421 (IS98). For a general discussion of this priority,
see Blair, The Priority of the United States in FEquity Receiverships (1925) 39 HTAV.
L. REv. 1.
59. Fordham, Preferences )I Prerceie'crshlp Claims in 1L.nii3 Iicc'ivershaps (1931)
15 Mixx. L. Rav. 261, 288-290.
ADMINISTRATIE EXPENSES
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
that reorganization courts should have broad discretionary powers over the
protection of obligations under Subsection (i).
When a reorganization proceeding commenced under 77B proves unsuc-
cessful, the treatment of costs incurred therein depends upon the subsequent
disposition of the estate. If the property is returned to the debtor, the costs
of administration may be said to constitute a charge upon the res, and must
usually be borne by the debtor itself.60 When the property is returned to
a trustee or receiver in a prior proceeding, the 77B court must hand it over
"upon such terms as the judge may deem equitable for the protection of
obligations incurred by any trustee or trustees under this section, and for
the payment of administrative expenses and allowances in the proceeding
hereunder."' 61 Without any mention of this clause, several reorganization
courts have deducted the costs of administering the 77B proceeding from
the total assets of the estate before handing the property over to a prior
trustee.62 Even where the allowances fixed by the 77B court are not made
payable immediately, however, the statute would seem to require that the
administrative expenses and obligations of the reorganization must eventually
be paid in full by the superseding court.
More complicated problems are presented where the debtor's estate is
liquidated under Section 77B(k). 3 This Section provides that, as soon as
the order for liquidation is made, the priority sections of the Bankruptcy
Act, from which reorganization proceedings are exempt, come into operation,
and the usual bankruptcy procedure must be followed. Although it is well
settled that the costs of administration in bankruptcy are entitled to priority
over unsecured claims,- the term, costs of administration, is given a much
60. it re Nine North Church Street, Inc., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 14050 (N. D.
N. Y. 1936), aff'd, 89 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; cf. In re W. N. Britton Realty
Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 114357 (W. D. N. Y. 1936). This policy is considered
proper in 3 GERDES, Op. cit. su pra note 14, § 1163. On the dismissal of an equity re-
ceivership either the debtor [Speakman v. Bryan, 61 F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) ; see
Burnrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 274 U.S. 208, 214 (1927)], or the person filing
the receivership petition [Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Newman, 187 Fed. 573 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1911)], is charged with the expenses of the receivership. It may, therefore,
be within the power of the reorganization court to charge a creditor who files the peti-
tion with the reorganization expenses.
61. §77B(i).
62. Oakland Hotel Co. v. Crocker First Nat. Bank, 85 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 9th,
1936); In re W. N. Britton Realty Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. V 4357 (W. D. N. Y.
1936) (properties formerly in foreclosure proceedings turned back to receivers burdened
with the reorganization charges allocable to the properties).
63. In liquidation proceedings administrative expenses have sometimes been ordered
paid first, although there has been no discussion of the propriety of this treatment. In re
Manhattan Music Hall, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 48 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) ; In re Green Mountain
Syrup Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 114238 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
64. Section 64(b) (3) gives the costs of administration in a bankruptcy proceeding
a specific priority over unsecured claims; secured claims, however, are usually protected
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narrower significance in bankruptcy than in reorganization. Disputes have,
therefore, arisen as to whether various costs recognizable under 77B are
entitled to priority in a subsequent liquidation. Typical of these disputes is
the problem centering around the compensation of creditors' attorneys. It
has been held that Section 77B (c) (9), which provides for the payment of
such compensation in 77B proceedings, applies to liquidation as well, and
hence takes precedence over 64(b),65 the priority section of the act. But
another court has held that it only applies to successful reorganizationsCG
Equally confusing is the treatment of obligations incurred in the 77B pro-
ceeding. These obligations may include any of the numerous costs incurred
by the trustee in operating the business of the debtor while in reorganization,
but, since Section 64 is strictly construed, the only claims which will be
entitled to priority under this section in a subsequent liquidation are those
related to the preservation of the debtor's estate.6 - In certain cases, how-
ever, priority might be granted under a different rationale. Section 77B (c) (3)
empowers reorganization courts to authorize the issuance of certificates for
cash or other considerations and to grant them such priority over svcured
and unsecured claims as shall be lawful in the particular case. s When prior
obligations are represented by these certificates, they may be given the
stated priority under Section ('7(d) which provides for the protection of
liens validly incurred prior to the commencement of the liquidation pro-
ceeding.
by Section 67(d) which take precedence ovr Sectin 64. In re llowll and King
Co., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 984 (M. D. Pa. 193f)). But th- e expcnse' which represent the
costs ,of preserving the property to, which prior livets attach. air the cktt ,of saie of the
property and of bringing it into court. ta!. priority over lienhldv r4. Ili re I'el Displays,
Inc., 74 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 2d. 1935): -e RFrmm.rox, B-% m xtrc" (4th Vd, 1931)
§§ 446. 2613, 2631, 2662.
65. Oakland Hotel Co. v. Crocker First Nat. Batk. 85 F. (2d) 959 (C. C.A. 9th.
1936) ; In re Green Mountain Syrup Corp. C. C. H. Bankr. Secy. ' 4238 tS. D, X. Y.
1936).
66. In re Manhattan Music Hall, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 48 (S. D. X. Y. 1936).
67. See note 64, supra.
68. The "where lawful" phrase may mean that, as in receiverships. e': nses 61
running the business can be given priority over secured claims only when tle lien-
holders have so authorized. See notes 18. 22. supra. F-or a decision which aprarently
decides against this possibility, see In re Prima Co., 8E F. (2d) 785 (C C. A. 7th, 1937),
(1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 736.
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